An opinion piece on the Takaichi administration and its’ impact on foreign labour

By: Damia Nourrys

The Japanese economy stands on two diverging tracks. Megacities hum with innovation and tourism, yet sectors such as eldercare and agriculture struggle to find enough workers. Japan’s total population has fallen for 16 consecutive years, and its dual challenge of rapid ageing and persistently low birth rates continues to intensify. Former prime minister Fumio Kishida captured the gravity of this moment when he warned that Japan is “on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society” (Wright, 2023). With the working-age population projected to fall short by nearly 11 million workers by 2040, Japan faces a labour crisis that no urban boom can fully mask (Edmond & North, 2023). Whether the country can confront this reality now depends heavily on the policy direction of the newly established Takaichi administration.

Sanae Takaichi has made history as Japan’s first female prime minister. Yet her ascent has complicated claims that her leadership represents a step forward for progressive politics. Rather than signalling reform, Takaichi’s record reflects a broader conservative shift within the Liberal Democratic Party. She has resisted reforms that would substantively expand women’s legal autonomy within marriage, defended revisionist interpretations of Japan’s wartime history, and aligned herself with hardline nationalist factions within the ruling coalition (Semans, 2025; Sato, 2026). Within the context of labour and migration, scholars have noted that her policy positions are rooted in nationalism and traditional social norms, often framing foreigners as potential threats to social cohesion rather than as economic contributors (Sato, 2026; Simpson, 2025).

This posture sits uneasily with Japan’s economic needs. Acute labour shortages persist in healthcare, eldercare, agriculture and other labour-intensive sectors. Yet instead of pursuing a pragmatic expansion of migration pathways, the Takaichi government has prioritised cultural homogeneity, favouring highly controlled and restrictive categories of entry that make long-term employment and settlement for foreign workers increasingly difficult. Moreover, Samfat (2024) presents Japan’s alternative against accepting dependence on migrant labour: robotics. In order to combat labour shortage, Japan’s expertise in robotics has helped support manufacturing industries and is being introduced into other areas, earning consideration of becoming “The Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

Despite this rhetoric, Japan’s reliance on foreign labour has quietly deepened. Nearly four million foreign nationals now reside in the country, accounting for roughly 3.2% of the total population (Chai & Jou, 2026). In some municipalities, foreign residents make up more than 10% of the local population. These workers increasingly fill gaps left by a shrinking domestic labour force, particularly in sectors where Japanese workers are either unavailable or unwilling to work (Burgess, 2024; The Straits Times, 2025). Without them, the pressures created by rapid ageing and workforce contraction would be significantly more severe.

Yet public resistance to immigration remains strong. Survey data suggests that nearly 60% of respondents express concern or opposition toward accepting foreign workers, most commonly citing fears related to crime and cultural disruption (Chai & Jou, 2026). This disconnect between economic reliance and social acceptance produces a striking paradox: Japan increasingly depends on foreign labour to sustain its economy, while political discourse and public sentiment continue to resist meaningful multicultural integration.

The contradiction is particularly evident in the Takaichi administration’s proposed policy agenda. Measures expected to be rolled out in 2026 include requiring foreigners to pay health insurance premiums upfront, tightening visa and property ownership regulations, and raising barriers to citizenship. While these policies are framed as restoring public trust and social order, they risk undermining the long-term sustainability of foreign labour participation in the Japanese economy. In this sense, Japan mirrors other ageing societies such as Hungary and Italy, where governments acknowledge the economic necessity of immigration yet resist it politically in favour of nationalist narratives (Simpson, 2025).

This tension is further amplified by Takaichi’s appeal to younger voters through social media. Her carefully curated online presence – emphasising accessibility, decisiveness, and national pride – has helped repackage conservative policies in a more relatable form (which in turn has even earned her own merchandise like stationeries and cookies with caricatures of her in Nara Prefecture.). Labelled “Takaichi Fever” by international media, this strategy has translated into unusually high approval ratings among voters in their 20s, despite ongoing economic challenges, a weakening yen, and deteriorating relations with China (CNN, 2026). In this way, political style has softened the reception of policies that may otherwise face greater scrutiny.

Japan now approaches a pivotal lower house election. Takaichi has stated that she would step down should her party fail to secure a majority, though her growing popularity makes this outcome unlikely. As a result, Japan faces a clear choice. Its demographic crisis is undeniable, and its dependence on foreign labour is deepening. Yet social norms and political incentives continue to push policy in the opposite direction. Without reforms that move beyond a de facto “Japan First” agenda, the country risks prolonged labour shortages, slower economic growth, and rising social friction — a society caught between demographic necessity and ideological resistance.

Reference List

Burgess, C (2024). Japan’s multiculturalism fails to keep pace with rising migration. East Asia Forum. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/06/05/japans-multiculturalism-fails-to-keep-pace-with-rising-migration/​

Chai, P, Jou, W (2026). The Paradox of Japan’s Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and Demand for Foreign Labor. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/the-paradox-of-japans-anti-immigrant-sentiments-and-demand-for-foreign-labor/

CNN. How Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi Won Over Young Voters. TikTok. https://vt.tiktok.com/ZSa3o3FDV/

Edmond, C, North, M (2023). More than 1 in 10 people in Japan are aged 80 or over. Here's how its ageing population is reshaping the country. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/09/elderly-oldest-population-world-japan/​

Samfat, P (2024). Is Japan willing to embrace multiculturalism to address its labour shortage?. Young Diplomats Society. https://www.theyoungdiplomats.com/post/is-japan-willing-to-embrace-multiculturalism-to-address-its-labour-shortage

Sato, D (2025). Japan’s Iron Lady – Is Japan Taking a Hard Right?. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/japans-iron-lady-is-japan-taking-a-hard-right/

Semans, H (2025). Japan one step closer to relaxing single-surname rule for married couples. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/26/japan/politics/surname-takaichi-bill/

Simpson, A (2025). Japan needs foreign workers, not Takaichi’s hyper-nationalism. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/japan-needs-foreign-workers-not-takaichis-hyper-nationalism/​

The Straits Times (2025). Japan’s foreign workforce hits record high as labour crisis deepens. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japans-foreign-workforce-hits-record-high-as-labor-crisis-deepens?​

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Wright, G (2025). Japan PM says country on the brink over falling birth rate. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64373950

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